There are limits to bonhomie

By Javid Husain
September 20, 2025

Several developments since June have helped improve climate of relations between Pakistan and US

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar shake hands for photographers assembled at the State Department in Washington, DC US, July 25, 2025. — Rueyers

The lunch hosted by US President Trump for COAS Field Marshal Asim Munir at the White House on June 18, a few days before the US air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, ignited a heated debate among policymakers and analysts in Pakistan on the substance and implications of this friendly gesture for Pakistan and the region.

The gesture assumed increased significance as it came in the wake of the disagreement between Washington and New Delhi on the American role in stopping the conflict between Pakistan and India in May this year and the strains in Indo-US relations because of the American threat to impose heavy tariffs on imports from India.

Several developments since June have helped improve the climate of relations between Pakistan and the US. They include recognition of the convergence of their interests in such areas as counterterrorism and economic cooperation, imposition of 19% tariffs by the US on imports from Pakistan as against 50% on imports from India, and the visit of DPM/Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar to Washington DC in July to develop the bilateral relationship.

The talks between Foreign Minister Dar and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio during the visit focused on cooperation in areas including trade, investment, agriculture, technology and minerals. Further, the visit of a delegation of US businessmen earlier this month led to MOUs for exploring, developing and exporting Pakistan’s untapped mineral wealth.

These developments must be viewed in their proper historical context and against the backdrop of the prevailing geopolitical landscape to accurately assess their significance. Historically, Pakistan’s relations with the US have been marked by ups and downs. In the first phase of this relationship, Pakistan was part of the US-led system of alliances against the Soviet Union and received American military and economic assistance. However, this did not prevent the US from imposing an arms embargo against Pakistan because of the Pakistan-India war or from imposing sanctions on Pakistan later under the Carter administration because of its nuclear programme.

The 1980s saw close cooperation between the two countries in supporting the Afghan jihad against the Soviet occupation and the provision of military assistance by the Reagan administration to Pakistan by circumventing the US nuclear non-proliferation legislation. However, American sanctions on Pakistan were resumed soon after the Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan.

America adopted punitive measures against Pakistan after its nuclear explosions in 1998, carried out in response to the Indian nuclear explosions. The post-9/11 period witnessed the resumption of the US military and economic assistance to Pakistan, primarily to secure Pakistan’s support in its war against the Afghan Taliban. This phase, which was not free of strains or irritants, came to an end after the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.

The point to note is that historically, the US has used Pakistan as an instrument for the realisation of its strategic goals. It developed close friendly relations and cooperation with Pakistan whenever it suited its strategic interests and distanced itself from the latter whenever its perceived interests so demanded. Pakistan’s policymakers must, therefore, try to understand the factors which have prompted the Trump administration in its present incarnation to extend overtures to Pakistan.

First and foremost, America needs Pakistan’s cooperation in counterterrorism so that the terrorist outfits in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the region do not become a source of threat to the US security or the security of its allies and friends. Fortunately, there is a convergence of interests between the US and Pakistan on this issue. Second, by making these friendly gestures, the Trump administration hopes to wean Pakistan somewhat away from China and to simultaneously exert pressure on India to fall in line with the Trump administration’s expectations in matters relating to trade policy and India’s claims of strategic autonomy.

The Trump administration also hopes that the two countries can cooperate to their mutual benefit in dealing with issues of regional peace and security, keeping in view Pakistan’s special position as the only nuclear Muslim power and its support for moderation in the Islamic world. Finally, there are attractive possibilities of mutually beneficial cooperation between Pakistan and the US in trade, investment, technology and mining.

But a deeper and long-term analysis of strategic realities and emerging trends reveals areas of divergence between Pakistan and the US. To begin with, the US policy pursued for more than a quarter of a century under five Republican and Democratic administrations to build up India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific region in pursuance of America’s policy of containment of China is the source of the most important strategic divergence between Pakistan and the US. This policy, which has been deeply institutionalised in the American foreign policy and security establishment, has worked to Pakistan’s disadvantage as it has the potential to upset the strategic balance in South Asia.

In the long run, this policy is unlikely to change significantly despite the current irritants in US-India relations or between President Trump and PM Modi. Even if President Trump persists in his current approach to India, the next administration is likely to revert to the US policy of building up India as a major world power of the 21st century to balance China’s rise and to check the expansion of its power and influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. India’s hegemonic designs in this region, thus, perfectly dovetail with the American strategic aim to contain China.

Pakistan, on the other hand, neither has the will nor the capability to support the US policy of containment of China. It is in Pakistan’s interest rather to develop its ties and cooperation with China in the economic and security fields to restore the strategic balance in South Asia, which has been disturbed by the American pro-India policy, and to accelerate its economic progress. The launch of CPEC 2.0 by the leaders of the two countries, therefore, is an important initiative which both Pakistan and China should pursue in earnest. Such an approach by Pakistan would also place it on the right side of history, which is transitioning towards a multipolar world.

Besides the above, there are serious policy differences between the US and Pakistan on the Palestine issue, the Israeli genocide in Gaza and Iran’s nuclear programme. Islamabad also cannot ignore America’s proclivity to blatantly violate the rules of international law and the principles of the UN Charter, as demonstrated by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its recent air strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

In short, Pakistan’s efforts to develop friendly relations with the US should be pursued keeping in view both the potential and the limitations of this relationship. These efforts certainly should not be at the expense of our vital strategic relationship with China, which has been a steadfast friend of Pakistan over the past seven decades, in contrast with the record of oscillations in US policy towards Pakistan.


The writer is a retired ambassador and author of ‘Pakistan and a World in Disorder – A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century’. He can be reached at: javid.husaingmail.com


Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.



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