The age of hard power is back with a vengeance. Across continents, from Asia to the Americas, Europe to Africa, norms, laws and even UN resolutions are being brushed aside. What matters is force in terms of military capability, financial muscle and the audacity to use both.
The veneer of credibility once lent to global governance has eroded. Israel's genocide against Palestinians continues unchecked, backed by billions in US dollars, lethal weapons and repeated UN Security Council vetoes. Ukraine and Russia battle and bleed on. The US postures as an ally — acknowledged by the Gulf as one — but acts in different ways.
According to Israeli officials, Washington knew of Israeli strikes planned against Qatar, yet failed to warn its "billion-dollar deal-maker friend".
Meanwhile, the West itself is in conflict. Europe and the US are divided on Russia and Western societies that once embraced immigrants are now boiling over with rage against them. The melting pots of yesterday are fast seeming to be combustible zones.
This is the environment in which states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen and beyond, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, find themselves confronting external threats — most dangerously from Israel.
India, Israel's closest ally after the US, has long sought regional hegemony. But in May, the Modi-Doval doctrine of force projection was dealt a heavy blow. India's reckless May 7 attack on Pakistan backfired spectacularly.
Islamabad seized the moment, demonstrating an integrated multi-domain defence strategy, unrivalled air superiority and — for the first time — indigenous cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. The following month, during Israel's 12-day war against Iran, Pakistan again stood tall. Its unequivocal, boldly articulated diplomatic support for Tehran was widely appreciated across the Muslim world.
Together, the May and June wars confirmed two realities: hard power is central to global politics, and Pakistan has emerged as both militarily formidable and diplomatically credible.
The shift owes to Pakistan's standing linked to Pakistan's traditional role and to Field Marshal COAS Asim Munir who has adopted a doctrine of "offensive defence", changing the nature of Pakistan's power projection.
This aggressive-defensive power projection doctrine prioritises rigorous training, preparedness for both conventional and non-conventional threats, and critically, a willingness to use force not just defensively but to push for the settlement of historic disputes.
Kashmir tops that list. So does Palestine, where Pakistan has consistently and openly called for implementing UN resolutions for a Palestinian state with pre-1967 borders and Jerusalem as its capital. The Pakistan Army has also doubled down on global partnerships. Ties with China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Oman remain strong.
Relations with the US are cautiously being rebuilt, while new friendships with Russia and Azerbaijan are taking root. Joint training, defence production and arms exports give Pakistan’s military a visible global footprint.
Historically, Islamabad’s major partnerships — with the US, China and Saudi Arabia — began with security ties before economic or diplomatic links followed. That pattern endures.
Pakistan's security presence in the Middle East dates back decades, rooted in Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s outreach in the early 1970s. Despite fluctuations, ties remained unbroken. Three events — the 1971 breakup of Pakistan, the launch of its nuclear programme and its engagement with the Middle East — shaped Islamabad’s trajectory of involvement in the Middle East.
That history came full circle on September 19, when Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA). Its central clause is blunt: "an attack against one will be considered an attack against both".
For Pakistan, this is a strategic leap. It reclaims the country’s earlier high-profile role in Middle Eastern security. Early signs are promising: Qatar, Egypt and Turkey are already exploring similar agreements with Islamabad.
At the UN General Assembly, Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar was a special invitee at a Qatar-chaired regional security meeting — a far cry from the days when, not too long ago, Arab states sought Pakistan to not be too active diplomatically on Gaza. For Saudi Arabia, the benefits are equally clear. It diversifies security partnerships, no longer relying solely on the US. This time, Riyadh's partner is a nuclear-armed Pakistan with proven strategic capabilities.
The SMDA also raises pressing questions. One, will Pakistan provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella? Given Islamabad’s doctrine of offensive defence and Israel’s repeated aggression, the answer is a likely yes. But for now, given strategic sensitivities, it is one that won't get a clear answer from either party.
Two, does this replace US-Saudi defence ties? No. It supplements them, giving Riyadh more options while retaining American backing. Three, could this be the seed of a regional military alliance with Pakistan at the core? Quite possibly. The region’s threat environment makes it more than likely.
Four, did Washington approve? Both Riyadh and Islamabad seem to have kept Washington, Tehran and Beijing informed. The Saudi defence minister tweeted after meeting CENTCOM's chief as well as Iran’s national security adviser.
Pakistan, too, briefed all key players. Five, China’s role? While not yet formalised, it will be hard to ignore. With deep ties to both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and China’s cutting-edge defence technology, Beijing is well-positioned to become a partner in this evolving security arrangement.
The world is once again defined by hard power. Israel's unchecked aggression, India’s failed bravado, blatant double standards and Europe’s divisions all underscore that reality.
For Pakistan, this turbulent environment has opened a new space. Militarily, it has demonstrated sophistication and resolve. Diplomatically, it has shown confidence and clarity.
And with the Pakistan-Saudi SMDA, Islamabad has re-entered the Middle East not as a junior partner, but as a central security actor. This is Pakistan’s reassertion — at the intersection of South Asia, the Middle East and the wider Muslim world.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.
The writer is a senior journalist. She tweets at nasimzehra and can be reached at: nasimzehragmail.com