Pakistan and Afghanistan forces have been locked in a confrontation that, in its scale and persistence, has no precedent in recent decades. Over the past five days, the two neighbours have slid into open hostilities, punctuated only by short-lived pauses for dialogue.
What began as a cycle of cross-border attacks has evolved into a major military crisis, testing both Islamabad and Kabul's paradoxically both political prudence and military capability.
For months, Islamabad has pressed Kabul to rein in TTP militants operating freely from Afghan territory. Senior officials — among them the deputy prime minister and foreign minister — have engaged Taliban leaders repeatedly, linking the broader bilateral relationship to concrete counterterrorism cooperation.
Trade, transit and economic coordination were part of this dialogue, along with the key demand being singular: stop cross-border attacks. Despite over twenty formal demarches by Pakistan’s special envoy on Afghanistan the Taliban leadership’s refrain hardened from early reassurances to open defiance — eventually telling Islamabad to “deal with the TTP inside your own territory”.
Pakistan's message in recent days has been unmistakable i.e., either Kabul collaborates to neutralise anti-Pakistan groups or it must accept the consequences of a cross-border kinetic response. The Taliban’s counter-narrative, however, rooted in incapacity and loyalty to the TTP, has been cloaked as sovereignty.
Since 2021, their position has evolved from vague promises of cooperation to a flat refusal to act, coupled with the warning that Pakistan must not take military steps on Afghan soil. This defiance has come even as TTP attacks inside Pakistan multiplied, killing hundreds of civilians and soldiers.
When Taliban fighters and TTP units crossed into Pakistani territory from near at least ten to twelve Pakistan-Afghan border crossings on the nights of October 10 and 11, Pakistan responded with a full-spectrum military response.
Subsequently, in the second round the Taliban's forces, relying on old Soviet-era tanks and guerrilla tactics, briefly penetrated border posts but were swiftly repelled.
Their calculus appears based on the belief that hit-and-run tactics and surprise offensives can offset Pakistan's conventional superiority. Yet such attacks only deepen the asymmetry: Pakistan's response capacity, both in technology and organisation, far outstrips what Kabul can absorb.
The next 48 hours may well determine whether this confrontation, now in a temporary ceasefire mode, stabilises or spirals. Pakistan’s second wave of aerial and artillery blitzkrieg has inflicted heavy losses, forcing Kabul to weigh the sustainability of continued escalation.
Still, Pakistan's dilemma is partly of its own making. Years of deterrence dilution — oscillating between negotiating with the TTP, offering amnesty and pursuing limited counter-operations — blurred Islamabad’s red lines. This policy incoherence emboldened both the TTP and their Taliban hosts.
The coming days will show whether Pakistan’s firm military response restores deterrence or triggers a new phase of low-intensity conflict. While the 48-hour ceasefire has held intermittently, Pakistan’s official position remains that restraint followed Kabul's own request.
The Taliban, for their part, have claimed parity in decision-making, claiming they too responded only to Pakistan's ceasefire request. On the ground, Pakistan's superior firepower has severely degraded Taliban-linked positions and inflicted disproportionate damage on TTP formations operating from Afghan territory.
China, Russia, and Iran have each called for dialogue and restraint, with Beijing explicitly linking stability to the protection of Chinese nationals and investments in Afghanistan.
Tehran has urged both sides to resume formal talks, while Moscow has reiterated its interest in a negotiated end to hostilities. Saudi Arabia has echoed these appeals and, characteristically, US President Donald Trump has hinted at a personal role in mediation.
Notably, none of these states has blamed Pakistan for initiating the crisis. The TTP remains under UN sanctions, and Pakistan's recent election to the relevant sanctions committee strengthens its diplomatic position to press for compliance.
Afghanistan’s transformation into a hub of transnational militancy has become a growing concern for all regional powers. UN reports and independent research institutes alike warn that the persistence of armed non-state actors on Afghan soil threatens not only Pakistan but also China’s western provinces, Iran’s eastern border and Central Asia’s fragile security.
The current standoff also raises important conceptual questions within strategic studies discourse. Pakistan's limited strikes cannot be equated with doctrines of offensive-defence or pre-emptive war historically critiqued as hegemonic tools by larger powers.
Islamabad's actions fit more within the framework of coercive diplomacy — using limited force to signal resolve, not to occupy or expand territory. Nevertheless, Pakistan must remain alert to the risks of escalation dominance and avoid slipping into an open-ended confrontation that benefits no one.
Whatever Pakistan's past policy missteps towards Afghanistan, its current position is both justified and perilous. Justified, because no state can indefinitely tolerate cross-border terrorism; perilous, because Afghanistan’s collapse into perpetual conflict would inevitably spill back into Pakistan. The two countries remain interdependent twins — geographically bound, historically intertwined and economically co-dependent.
For lasting stability, both sides must shift from reactive militarism to structured engagement. Kabul must recognise that shielding or tolerating anti-Pakistan militants undermines its own sovereignty and security.
Islamabad, in turn, must integrate diplomacy and force in a coherent framework — one that preserves deterrence credibility while leaving the door open for negotiated cooperation. Islamabad has adopted a "deter-to-defend" posture–swift, proportionate retaliation to enforce red lines, paired with readiness to de-escalate diplomatically once immediate threats are neutralised.
In the end, neither coercion alone nor diplomacy alone will suffice. The path forward demands a dual strategy: sustained diplomatic outreach backed by credible readiness to use force when red lines are breached.
Only through this calibrated balance can Pakistan and Afghanistan avert a destructive cycle of escalation and instead move toward necessary security-bound coexistence.
The writer is a senior journalist. She posts at nasimzehra and can be reached at: nasimzehragmail.com
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