What will be achieved in Istanbul, and with what intention will Kabul move? Pakistan’s intentions are now out in the open: right behind dialogue and diplomacy, the kinetic will be activated to deliver where nothing else works.
This is necessary but insufficient. For both neighbours, given their long, complex interdependency, it’s a relationship that ought to spell peaceful coexistence rather than chaos and conflict. The obstacles remain significant.
The Doha agreement was positive not only because it ended the bloodshed that left dozens dead and hundreds injured on both sides, but also because it created space for cooperation. Yet Pakistan’s challenge remains formidable: while the Taliban government rules in name, it lacks writ across much of the country.
This crisis must be seen in the context of four years of cross-border attacks and sabotage launched from Afghan territory, often by the TTP, with at least the neglect, if not tacit support, of Afghan Taliban elements and commanders reportedly backed by third countries, including India.
Still, Pakistan’s pursuit of stability is not without assets. Afghan traders conducting billions of dollars in commerce with and through Pakistan have a clear stake in a peaceful, cooperative relationship. This trading community has often acted as a stabilising force – most recently when, after border closures disrupted commerce, joint pressure from traders on both sides pushed for reopening crossings.
Ordinary Afghans, many of whom have lived in Pakistan since the Soviet invasion, also represent a constituency for peace. They have familial, cultural and educational ties to Pakistan. While some voices critical of Pakistan dominate Afghan media, many citizens have directly experienced Pakistan as a place of refuge, education and livelihood – shaping a less vocal but enduring preference for constructive ties.
Over three million Afghan refugees still living in Pakistan have a similar stake in cordial relations. Despite the enormous economic, environmental and political burden their presence imposes, Pakistan has continued to host them.
Beyond these bilateral compulsions lies a broader regional dynamic favouring stability. All of Afghanistan’s neighbours – China, Iran, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – have voiced concern over Kabul’s harbouring of terrorist groups that export conflict. China, for example, has struggled to secure the extradition of members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), while a senior Russian official recently stated that 21 militant groups currently operate from Afghan soil.
Islamabad’s demand that Kabul rein in the TTP and dismantle training camps enjoys quiet regional sympathy. Afghanistan’s inability or unwillingness to act against such groups undermines both its own sovereignty and Pakistan’s security.
While bringing relations to this point of crisis is largely Kabul’s doing, Pakistan too bears responsibility, especially for historical choices since the 1979 Soviet invasion. With US support, Pakistan orchestrated one of modern history’s largest covert wars by backing the Afghan Mujahideen. That jihad, initially aimed at expelling Soviet forces, evolved into a transnational militant movement with enduring regional fallout.
More recently, Pakistan’s weakness has been ineffective border management. Despite new systems – biometrics, passports and visa controls – serious loopholes persist. Technology alone cannot secure the frontier; it must be matched by disciplined, corruption-free border governance.
Pakistan must treat this as a real border, not a porous line, and dismantle the criminal ecosystem that sustains smuggling and militancy. The Afghan-Tajik and China-Pakistan borders, despite their difficult terrain, maintain far tighter control.
Ad-hoc policymaking has also diluted Pakistan’s Afghan approach. A recent example appears to be the September 13 decision to offer long-term ten-year residency visas to foreigners, including Afghans, reportedly for a $1 million fee, departing from earlier Afghan Apex Committee’s proposals to grant visas in exchange for a $300,000 investment.
Meanwhile, at the heart of Kabul’s recurrent provocations lies its refusal to fully recognise Pakistan’s sovereignty and borders. It has remained a persistent political instrument employed by successive Afghan governments to generate pressure on Pakistan and to create the illusion of strategic leverage.
The latest military escalation has at least given Islamabad the opportunity to assert its red lines clearly. For far too long, Pakistan has, in its own caution, allowed Afghanistan to weaponise a long-settled and internationally recognised issue: the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.
Reportedly, in the original Qatar statement announcing continuation of the ceasefire, the term Pakistan-Afghanistan border was removed at Kabul’s insistence. Islamabad did well to ignore this posturing. Yet the pattern continues. More than two years ago, Kabul’s response to Pakistan’s draft renewal of the Transit Trade Agreement again revealed this same irrational and revisionist impulse.
The Taliban government has refused to sign the draft, demanding that Pakistan replace the word border with the Durand Line and even insisting that trade terms at the Wagah-Attari crossing – entirely unrelated to Afghan transit trade – be included in the agreement.
These are not minor objections. This is a refusal to acknowledge ground realities: two sovereign UN-member states with defined frontiers, passports and customs regimes. Kabul’s repeated attempts to reopen a closed question, and to align with India in politically and diplomatically pressuring Pakistan while allowing India-sponsored terror networks to operate from its soil, betray both bad faith and strategic recklessness.
Islamabad must continue to communicate – firmly but unambiguously – that while Pakistan remains committed to peace and cooperation, any effort to undermine its territorial integrity or security will meet resolute and proportionate responses.
The roots of this strained relationship run deep. From voting against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947 to the armed Afghan incursion into Bajaur in 1960–61, repelled by Pakistan’s army and local tribesmen, Afghanistan’s conduct has repeatedly reflected a refusal to reconcile with Pakistan’s sovereignty. Yet paradoxically, the robust links between peoples and also occasionally between governments have also been there.
It is now imperative for Islamabad to address Kabul’s legitimate concerns constructively, strengthen governance at the border and make clear to Kabul that violations of Pakistan’s territorial integrity will invite decisive responses. At the same time, Pakistan must build trust through engagement with all Afghan groups, irrespective of ethnicity or faction, while abandoning the old habit of picking favourites.
The writer is a senior journalist. She tweets nasimzehra and can be reached at: nasimzehragmail.com