Pakistan’s civil–military coordination remains fragmented. In Swat (2009–2010), the military cleared the territory, but post-conflict civilian rehabilitation lags years behind – a classic case of uncoordinated 'clear vs hold vs build'.
The army leads kinetic operations while civilian counter-extremism (Nacta, interior ministry) remains underfunded and disjointed. Result: security gains erode without civilian consolidation.
Pakistan’s civil–military coordination remains fragmented. In 2023, the army spearheaded the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) to fast-track investment decisions, but the ministries – finance, commerce, and petroleum – were slow to align fiscal or regulatory frameworks to complement the SIFC’s pipeline. Result: fragmented execution – investor engagement strong, but project delivery inconsistent.
Compare that to Vietnam: In Vietnam, the military-industry complex operates under a unified economic-development command – policy and execution converge.
Compare that to Turkey: In Turkey, Milli Guvenlik Kurulu – the National Security Council – is where civilian and military arms co-decide and co-budget programs as a continuous policy engine.
In Balochistan, military-engineered projects (FWO roads, Gwadar fencing, dam works) proceed under GHQ direction, but provincial departments rarely integrate them into long-term socio-economic planning or PSDP frameworks. The army’s engineering corps builds – the civilian side neither maintains nor monetises. Result: duplication of effort, limited local ownership, wasted fiscal potential. In Indonesia, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) has integrated military and civilian roles in areas of national defence, disaster response and community development. In Sweden, the civil–military coordination extends into disaster management and whole-of-government systems. In Chile, armed forces are integrated into broader governance.
Article 243 of Pakistan’s constitution is deceptively short, yet it sits at the heart of Pakistan’s civil–military balance. For the record, Article 243’s ambiguity has allowed dual command, parallel authority and blame without ownership. Clarifying this single article could do more for national coherence than another dozen committees.
Article 243 is deceptively brief and even more deceptively ambiguous. Clause (1) declares that “the federal government shall have control and command of the armed forces". Clause (3) introduces a second layer, granting that “the president shall, subject to law, have power". Then Clause (4) complicates the structure further: “the president shall, on the advice of the prime minister, appoint the chairman, joint chiefs of staff committee, and the chiefs of the army, navy and air staff". Result: Three centres of gravity, no single line of command.
Pakistan’s command structure remains undefined – the president commands symbolically, the PM commands politically, and the military commands practically. This diffusion of authority creates ambiguity in decision-making and weakens national coordination. What Pakistan needs is a constitutionally defined central command, where policy, defence and crisis response are synchronised under a single, elected chain of authority.
The nature of war has changed – from conventional battles to hybrid threats that demand instant response – and decisions now have to be made in hours, not weeks. In moments of crisis – North Korean missile launches, cyberattacks or pandemics – South Korea’s Blue House National Security Office moves fast; decisions are taken in minutes, not lost in bureaucratic delay.
Pakistan’s civil–military coordination remains fragmented because the state functions as two parallel power centres – civilian legitimacy without operational capability and military capability without democratic continuity. Success will come only when these two power centres converge into a single national command logic – one state, one strategy, one voice.
Article 243 must evolve from a ceremonial clause into a command doctrine – one that defines authority, embeds accountability and eliminates ambiguity.
The writer is a columnist based in Islamabad. He tweets/posts saleemfarrukh and can be reached at: farrukh15hotmail.com
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