What experts of the '92 operation say about Karachi today

By Umar CheemaISLAMABAD: As demand for a ruthless operation in Karachi mounts, the veterans of previous operations launched in mid-90s, which almost eliminated such killings, say an effective...

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What experts of the '92 operation say about Karachi today
By Umar Cheema
ISLAMABAD: As demand for a ruthless operation in Karachi mounts, the veterans of previous operations launched in mid-90s, which almost eliminated such killings, say an effective crackdown against criminals is only possible through the appointment of a brave and politically-neutral police chief.

Likewise, the police force involved in such an operation, they say, should be provided security guarantee that unlike the past when 83 police officers as well as 217 personnel who took part in the previous operations were eliminated by 500 suspected criminals arrested during the operation but released by the second Nawaz Sharif government without trial.

These experts, one still in government service and the other on a top job, were reluctant to come on record to discuss the Karachi situation but in background discussions gave their views freely.

As the Awami National Party has been demanding an Army operation in Karachi, these experts say exercising this option would aggravate the situation instead of alleviating the mess. They cite the last Army operation in support of their argument that lasted from June 1992 to June 1995 in vain, finally pushing the police to take over the charge that cleansed the city in a short span of only six-months under the leadership of Dr Shoaib Suddle, then DIG Karachi, finishing the task in January 1996.

The reason for the Army's failure, they argue, is attributed to lack of credible intelligence that could have only been gathered by the police that operates in the area. The false intelligence had then resulted in killing of many innocent persons as the whole building blocks were encircled during the Army operation with all able-bodied persons pulled out, blind-folded and several of them shot dead on the 'information' of the moles.

Notwithstanding the massive killings, no big catch could be apprehended during the Army operation. Realizing their failure, the Army acknowledged and pronounced its judgment through the then corps commander Karachi, Lt Gen Lehrasib that it was the job of the police to carry out a discreet hunt-and-held operation, an officer who served in Karachi told The News.

As Suddle took the reins, the then interior minister, late Naseerullah Babar, fully supported him. He was posted DIG Karachi at a time when he was about to leave the job of security advisor to the United Nations' secretary general. The current interior minister, Rehman Malik, was also very close to Babar then, however, was tasked with different type of assignments that lacked transparency and some extra-judicial activities, said the officer. The incumbent DG FIA, Waseem Ahmad, who was then deputy director in FIA, was also partly involved in this operation through Rehman Malik.

Suddle, soon after assuming the position, had stopped the indiscriminate killings, ensured the head money would be fully paid to informers, a practice that had ceased to exist and that their security guaranteed. He had told the police force in unequivocal terms that investigation of all the police encounters would be carried out through judicial probes in order to discourage the police from committing excesses, said the veteran of previous Karachi operation.

In a six-month span of operation carried out by the police, many high-value targets were arrested. As many as 150 police encounters had occurred, all of them went through the judicial scrutiny, notwithstanding the pressure from the federal government for not doing so.

Suddle, resisting instructions from the top bosses, would argue that judicial probe of the encounters is important for preventing the police from abuses. Under the law, every police encounter is followed by a judicial probe. Of the 150 encounters, only 10 were found fake by judicial inquiries.

The then police boss had also ensured that head-money would not go to the police officer above the rank of inspector in case the arrest had been made through the police effort without any instrumental role of a private informer.

It resulted in trickling money down to the subordinate staff instead of their bosses who generally in collaboration with the account officer and home ministry get the money for themselves, rewarding their subordinate only through promotions to next rank.

Normalcy returned to Karachi within six-months and as many as 500 criminals were arrested in the meanwhile. But all of them were set free as the change of guard took place in the Centre when PML-N voted to power formed an alliance with the smaller parties in Sindh. These 500 arrestedwere set-free.