Delhi's Indus Waters Treaty move is dangerous

Following the deadly terrorist attack in Pahalgam in Illegally Indian Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, India announced the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a water-sharing agreement with Pakistan that has endured wars, crises and regime changes for over six decades.

Citing national security concerns and Pakistan’s alleged involvement in the attack (a claim which has not been substantiated by any credible evidence whatsoever), India halted cooperation under the treaty, including data sharing and Permanent Indus Commission meetings. This move, while politically resonant, challenges fundamental principles of international law, treaty obligations and the cooperative management of shared resources. The implications extend far beyond the subcontinent.

Signed in 1960 with the World Bank’s facilitation, the IWT allocates the waters of the Indus River system between India (eastern rivers: Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) and Pakistan (western rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). It includes a dispute resolution mechanism and lacks an exit clause; Article XII provides that the treaty remains in force unless terminated by mutual agreement. Despite hostility between the two nations, the treaty functioned as a rare anchor of stability.

India’s current actions, while not a formal termination, amount to a de-facto suspension. India has placed the treaty in ‘abeyance’, withholding its obligations without formally renouncing them. International law, however, does not treat ‘abeyance’ as a legal status. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties addresses only suspension and termination (Articles 60–62). The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, made clear that suspending treaty obligations requires compliance with strict legal criteria.

Scholars like Anthony Aust reaffirm that ‘abeyance’ is political language, not a legal doctrine. The law requires either compliance or formal lawful suspension, not indefinite inaction. As such, India’s measures fall under unlawful suspension in the eyes of international law.

India might seek to justify its move under rebus sic stantibus, the doctrine allowing suspension in case of fundamental change in circumstances (Article 62, Vienna Convention). Yet this doctrine is extremely narrow. The ICJ has clarified that the change must be unforeseen, strike at the essential basis of consent, and radically transform the remaining obligations. Terrorist violence, tragic as it is, does not alter the hydrological, technical, or legal foundations of the IWT. The Indus still flows, and its allocation remains unchanged. Thus, any claim under rebus sic stantibus would likely fail.

India has not accused Pakistan of violating the treaty’s provisions directly, which is required under Article 60 for lawful suspension based on material breach. The allegations relate to terrorism, serious, but extraneous to the IWT. A treaty cannot be suspended based on grievances unrelated to its subject matter. International law demands proportionality and linkage, not political frustration.

India’s action also contravenes established principles of customary international water law. The UN Watercourses Convention (1997), though not ratified by either party, reflects widely accepted norms: equitable and reasonable utilisation, no significant harm and a duty to cooperate. Unilaterally suspending dialogue and threatening flow alterations violates these obligations. The principle of equitable utilisation prohibits states from over-using or denying co-riparian states their fair share.

The no-harm rule requires India to avoid causing serious injury to Pakistan through altered water flows. And most importantly, the duty to cooperate obliges regular engagement, data sharing and peaceful dispute resolution. By stepping back from these commitments, India undermines not just bilateral trust but international expectations of transboundary water governance.

The humanitarian impact on Pakistan could be dire. Over 90% of Pakistan’s agriculture depends on the water of the Indus. Crops like wheat, rice, and cotton in Punjab and Sindh are irrigated via this system. Already ranked among the most water-stressed countries by the World Resources Institute, Pakistan risks spiralling into water insecurity. Urban centres like Lahore and Karachi rely on Indus-fed aquifers, and hydropower installations generate nearly one-third of national electricity. Interruption in water flows, even temporarily, could jeopardise food security, drive mass migration and trigger economic destabilisation.

Access to water is also a recognised human right under international law. The UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 affirms water as essential for the realisation of life, health and dignity. If a state unilaterally disrupts water to another, especially in peacetime, it risks violating international human rights law, not just treaty law.

Pakistan’s legal options include invoking Article IX of the IWT and initiating arbitration. It may also approach the ICJ or the UN Security Council, arguing that India’s actions threaten international peace. Realistically, jurisdictional and political hurdles exist. But the symbolic and normative value of such legal challenges remains strong. They reaffirm rule of law as the proper avenue for resolving treaty disputes. For India, the decision carries reputational risks. As a self-styled proponent of international law, India’s credibility weakens when it selectively upholds binding commitments.

This could damage its bid for greater leadership in global institutions, raise red flags for treaty partners and undermine trust in its role in regional cooperation. There are strategic dangers too. By legitimising the idea of water as a political weapon, India inadvertently invites similar conduct by others, especially China, which controls upstream flows of the Brahmaputra. The erosion of treaty sanctity is a double-edged sword.

The broader global implications are equally troubling. The IWT has long been celebrated as a model transboundary water treaty. If one of the signatories can unilaterally suspend its participation without clear legal justification, what becomes of similar treaties elsewhere? Agreements over the Nile, the Jordan or the Mekong could all be endangered by this precedent. The weakening of ‘pacta sunt servanda’, the principle that treaties must be honoured, threatens the stability of international law more generally.

Water is the basis of life, the foundation of agriculture, energy, health and peace. Turning it into a bargaining chip sets a dangerous precedent not just for India and Pakistan but for every water-stressed region in the world. Once the idea that water-sharing treaties are optional takes hold, the door opens to an age of hydro-political brinkmanship.

India must be urged to restore full compliance with the treaty and re-engage through the Permanent Indus Commission. International actors, from the World Bank to the UN, must play a more visible role in mediation. Legal accountability must be paired with diplomatic pressure to reaffirm that the law still matters. Future water-sharing treaties must include stronger enforcement clauses and third-party oversight to prevent unilateral disengagement.

The suspension of the IWT represents more than a regional dispute. It is a test of the durability of law in the face of political anger, of the idea that rules should outlast war, and that cooperation must survive crisis. The rivers must continue to flow, not just with water, but with legality, accountability — and the shared will to live in peace.

The writer is the director of the Centre for Law, Justice & Policy (CLJP) at Denning Law School. He holds an LLM in Negotiation and Dispute Resolution from Washington University.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

Originally published in The News