What is Pakistan's leverage?

Pakistan’s latest attempt to court Washington carries a new sales pitch. Islamabad is not offering supply routes, intelligence packages or a renewed promise to fight terrorism. In 2025, the commodity on display for the US has been geology.

Copper, tungsten, antimony, gold and, most strategically, rare earth elements have become Pakistan’s trump card, the resources America needs. For Pakistan, the symbolism matters. After years of strained ties and economic freefall, being welcomed again at the White House suggests renewed relevance.

Leaders in Islamabad portray the trip as a reset that could shift relations from dependence on security rents to a new form of economic partnership. Yet, Pakistanis have seen such ceremonies before. They recall cold-war alliances that brought weapons but not schools and post-9/11 inflows that strengthened the security apparatus while public services lagged.

The proposition this time looks more sophisticated. Minerals can, at least in theory, be transformed into value-added exports. If refining takes place domestically, Pakistan can capture more of the supply chain, generating employment, foreign exchange and modest industrial growth.

In a country where the balance of payments repeatedly collapses under the weight of energy imports and weak exports, this is no small prize. Yet execution remains the problem. Pakistan’s history is littered with resource projects that collapsed into disputes, corruption or local resistance. The saga of Reko Diq is the most notorious, a copper and gold deposit that remained tied up for decades in arbitration.

Unless contracts become operating refineries, this initiative risks becoming another mirage. To succeed, Islamabad needs clear institutions and community consent.

The army chief’s presence in Washington will have reassured American officials that the commitments carry the authority of the only institution capable of enforcing them. There is logic to this — large projects in fragile districts do require security and coordination — but it perpetuates the imbalance. Regional politics is also shaping the choreography. America’s partnership with India remains central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, yet trade frictions and Delhi’s closeness to Moscow have created tension.

A warmer public embrace of Pakistan reminds India that Washington retains options. Delhi will not panic; its size and strategic role still anchor US policy. But it will lobby hard that any easing towards Islamabad be conditioned on action against militant groups.

China’s view is even more sensitive. Beijing has invested billions in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, embedding itself in infrastructure from Gwadar port to power plants. A US-linked minerals initiative on the same terrain looks like encroachment. Islamabad will insist diversification is not defection, but suspicion may run deep. To protect itself, Pakistan must rely on transparency: open bidding, published contracts and clear royalty streams. Without these, Beijing will suspect a drift.

Afghanistan lurks in the background too. Washington wants guarantees that Afghan soil will not again shelter transnational threats. Islamabad wants cross-border attacks by the TTP curbed without provoking wider conflict. Kabul’s rulers want recognition and resources while conceding little. No communique could resolve these contradictions, but the very fact of dialogue keeps channels open. For Pakistan, having minerals as an economic bargaining chip offers leverage. The Afghan connection extends beyond security. Refugee flows, narcotics trafficking and smuggling across porous borders directly affect Pakistan’s stability.

If Islamabad can persuade Washington that mineral development and trade create a stabilising effect along the frontier, it strengthens its case for long-term engagement. Conversely, if violence escalates, investors will stay away, leaving another round of promises unfulfilled.

For Afghans too, Pakistan’s success or failure matters. History provides ample lessons. In the 1950s, Pakistan became a formal ally of the US through Seato and Cento, hoping to gain lasting security guarantees. It received weapons and aid but little sustainable development. In the mid-1970s with Z A Bhutto as the first elected prime minister, when Islamabad pursued nuclear ambitions and ties with Arab countries and the Soviet Union, Washington distanced itself. In the 1980s, Pakistan was a frontline state in the Afghan jihad, rewarded with funds and arms, but militancy and drugs flowed back across its borders.

Trade policy, though quieter than security or minerals, may matter most for daily life. A few tariff concessions or energy deals can change exporters’ margins more than speeches. Pakistan sells textiles, surgical instruments, leather and software to America, often on slim profits. Even small duty reductions or cheaper electricity could make a difference. But markets care about Gazette notifications, not atmospherics. If concessions are genuine, the government should publish schedules and timelines.

The Gulf complicates matters further. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have repeatedly bailed out Pakistan and expect involvement in new ventures. Ideally, a triangular model could emerge, where American technology and markets, Gulf capital and Pakistani ore combine. That would spread risk and anchor multiple patrons in Pakistan’s stability. But triangles wobble when one partner feels ignored. Unless projects are transparently auctioned with space for multiple players, rivalry is inevitable.

Kashmir inevitably shadows every American encounter with Pakistan. Islamabad will present high-level meetings as proof that its grievances remain alive; Delhi will spin them as indulgence of a troublesome neighbour. In reality, Washington has no appetite for mediation, only crisis management. The most useful contribution it could make is encouraging technical cooperation across the Line of Control on issues like water management or disaster response. These measures will never dominate headlines.

The Gaza conflict adds another layer of complexity. PM Shehbaz Sharif’s presence alongside other Muslim leaders in New York discussions about humanitarian corridors was designed to project solidarity. For Pakistan, appearing as a credible Muslim voice matters. For Washington, the priority is to have Muslim-majority states support its positions without challenging its primacy. The balance is delicate: lean too far towards American stances and Islamabad faces domestic anger.

For ordinary Pakistanis, scepticism is instinctive. Past alliances enriched elites while citizens endured inflation, blackouts and failing public services. Unless the minerals strategy and trade promises deliver visible benefits, this visit will be remembered as another spectacle. To break the cycle, two steps are essential. First, all contracts must be published with environmental and community clauses. Second, oversight should be entrenched in law, requiring parliamentary and provincial scrutiny. Disillusionment runs deep because past windfalls rarely touched everyday life. IMF bailouts stabilised reserves but raised prices. Security assistance purchased equipment but not textbooks.

To persuade citizens that this time is different, revenues must translate into cheaper bills, functional clinics and better supplied schools. If a refinery rises in Balochistan and royalties flow into district health budgets, scepticism may soften. If not, cynicism will harden.

Pakistan’s youth, more than half the population, will be the real judges. They want jobs, digital opportunities and affordable education. If American investment and minerals revenue can be channelled into vocational training, start-ups and schools, optimism may return. If not, young people will continue to seek futures abroad, draining the very talent the economy needs.

Public legitimacy depends less on rhetoric in Washington and more on whether a student in Gwadar or a shopkeeper in Hyderabad feels a difference. South Asia as a whole will feel the ripples. Bangladesh also watches closely, competing for textile markets and wary of any US tilt towards Pakistan. Sri Lanka and Nepal will calculate how renewed American attention might shift investment patterns. India, already wary of Chinese influence in the neighbourhood, will now measure how much diplomatic space Pakistan regains. Even Afghanistan’s fragile economy is indirectly tied to whether Pakistan stabilises or stumbles. Thus, one Oval Office meeting shapes perceptions.

Success by 2026 would be unglamorous but may be real. It would mean construction at a refinery site in Hub or Chagai, haul roads built by local contractors, the batches of technicians trained at provincial universities and quarterly dashboards showing royalties financing clinics and classrooms. Such outcomes would not capture global headlines but would alter daily lives. Failure, by contrast, would feel all too familiar: stalled contracts, communities excluded, elites enriched and Pakistanis left to pay. The lesson for Islamabad is harsh. South Asia punishes illusions and rewards delivery. India will keep leveraging its market, China its infrastructure, America its options. Pakistan must learn to leverage results.

If the Washington meetings produce transparent contracts, functioning refineries and social services, they may mark a turn. If not, they will be remembered as one more sepia photograph. One further challenge is Pakistan’s civil-military imbalance. Without stronger parliamentary oversight and institutional transparency, even the most promising agreements risk being captured by elites rather than serving the broader population whose patience is wearing thin.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

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Originally published in The News