The finest hour

The seventeen-day war (1965) was a tactical victory for Pakistan, an operational stalemate and a politico-strategic watershed moment that unleashed political and social cross-currents that forced a political change in Pakistan after six years. To learn the right lessons and to avoid self-adulatory hagiography, one must accurately analyse the conflict and the factors that led to it.

Professor T V Paul’s Theory of Asymmetric warfare tells us that structural factors like power imbalances, territorial disputes and political grievances, along with tactical factors like the feasibility of covert warfare, encourage weak states to initiate wars through unconventional means. 

According to T V Paul, as the aggrieved state, Pakistan did not get a fair deal in the Kashmir dispute. It perceived a window of opportunity in 1965 to attain its political objectives vis-a-vis a stronger state — India.

That window of opportunity was due to a feeling amongst a hawkish civil-military clique that Pakistan had a chance to force a solution to the intractable Kashmir dispute due to a relative military parity on account of the qualitative edge enjoyed due to American arms and the perceived diplomatic support for a military adventure amongst leading global powers like the US.

Another factor was the deteriorating security situation in Indian occupied Kashmir and the likelihood of Kashmiris joining the guerrilla war. Operation Grand Slam, which planned to infiltrate six groups of approximately 700 to 800 troops each to foment an uprising and to inflict damage with a view to facilitating the subsequent operations by Pakistani forces to liberate areas from Indian occupation.

In the first week of August, six infiltrating groups, approximating a battalion size each, started crossing over into Occupied Kashmir across the CFL and the Pir Panjal Range. The infiltration, however, could not succeed due to faulty assumptions about locals’ ability to support the infiltrators and the logistics difficulties in the mountainous terrain. 

The Indians deployed two infantry divisions to counter these infiltrators, in addition to launching a major double pincer offensive against the strategic Hajipur Bulge, which Pakistan held. Another attack was launched in the Tithwal sector across the ceasefire line by India.

The Indian double pincer attack against Hajipir bulge made good progress as the Hajipir fell on August 28, while the southern pincer failed to link up due to the diversion of effort by Indian GOC Major General Kalan. 

Faced by this perilous situation on the 12 Division front in Kashmir, Major General Akhter Malik sought permission to launch Operation Gibraltar, an operational contingency of launching an attack on the axis Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur from Bhimbar. 

The offensive by 12 Division was led by two regular infantry brigades (10 and 102) and an Azad Kashmir Brigade (No 4 Sector), supported by two armoured regiments (11 Cav and 13 Lancers) and a Corps Artillery Brigade, in addition to the integral divisional artillery of 7 Division.

The 12 Division was to advance along axis Chamb-Jaurian-Akhnur, to sever the Line of Communication of the 25th Indian Infantry Division, holding Akhnur-Rajauri-Nowshera-Poonch Sector, to relieve pressure on the 12 Division. The Indians had the 191 Brigade defending Akhnur against this Pakistani riposte, which commenced on September 1. The Pakistani offensive was so devastating that by 8.50pm on September 1, the 191 Indian Brigade withdrew in panic to Akhnur.

The situation was critical on the night of September 1 and 3 for the Indian 191 Brigade, as there was nothing between Chamb and Akhnur except infantry elements, with the only Indian armour squadron in the area lying badly mauled at Chamb. Pakistan could have captured Akhnur with the 10th Brigade, which was to take Akhnur in Phase II. 

The enemy was shattered and demoralised, due to which surreal actions like the capture of a complete platoon of Sikh Light Infantry by an unarmed helicopter pilot (Lt Col, later Maj General Naseerulah Babur) took place. Then the unthinkable happened with an inexplicable change of command, due to which the command of the offensive was handed over to Major General Yahya Khan.

Even the Indians were stupefied, and in the words of Lt General Harbaksh Singh and Maj General Gurbaksh Singh, “this was a Godsend for Indian 41 Brigade”, which found time to consolidate its position around Jaurian, besides allowing Indian 20 Lancers to muster a strength of 14 tanks to oppose Pakistani armour. 

Pakistanis had squandered a golden chance to capture Akhnur and bottle up Indian forces North of Akhnur, affecting a recoil from Hajipir, Nowshera and Rajauri. The rattled Indians, to relieve pressure on Akhnur, launched an offensive across the international border in the Ravi Sutlej Sector I – Lahore-Burki.

The Indian attack further diluted the strength of Operation Grand Slam as forces were diverted from that sector to Lahore and the Sialkot sector. Warriors like Aziz Bhatti and Shafqat Baloch defended Lahore and Burki sectors resolutely, where PAF stopped the Indian offensive in its tracks across Batapur on the first day, facilitating 1 Armoured Division’s counter-offensive in the Khem Karan sector. 

Indians sacked GOC 15 Division Maj General Narainjan Prasad for cowardice opposite Lahore, while the Indian army chief lost his nerve ordering the Indian army’s withdrawal behind the Beas. Some equally irresolute decisions and operational miscoordination let Indians off the hook in the Khem Karan Sector, leading to a stalemate.

The Ravi Chenab Corridor where the Indian 1 Armoured Division supported by 6 Mountain and 14 Infantry Division posed a serious threat to the vastly outnumbered Pakistani troops, the men of steel from 25 Cavalry under Major Muhammad Ahmed and their intrepid CO Lt-Col Nisar beat back the repeated attacks of 1 Armoured Division stopping Indian 16 Cavalry at Gadgor on September 8 and scaring Indian armoured brigade commander so much that he failed to launch his uncommitted reserve of two armour regiments. 

Later, in an offensive role on September 11, the legendary Guide’s Cavalry regiment of the Pakistan Army, under the command of Lt-Col Amir Gulistan Janjua, launched a daring two-squadron counterattack. Due to caution induced by this resolute defence, the Indian 1 Corps did not dare plan any further offensive in the Sialkot Sector.

At sea, the Pakistan Navy attacked Dwarka, forcing a harried Indian fleet to be restricted to the safety of their harbours. A vastly outnumbered PAF shot down 104 IAF jets at the cost of only 19 aircraft, proving that it is not numbers but courage, better training and weapon systems that matter on the battlefield. The 1965 war was the finest hour of the Pakistan armed forces.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]

Originally published in The News