Different threats, same playbook

Pakistan is once again confronting a sharp rise in militant violence, marking one of the most challenging internal security phases since the peak of terrorist incidents in 2010.

In the years following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, attacks have increased in frequency, coordination and lethality. Yet the more troubling reality is not just the resurgence of militancy but the state’s continued reliance on a largely kinetic response to what are, in fact, two very different threats.

Pakistan today is dealing with two distinct theatres of violence – each driven by separate motivations, actors and end goals. Treating them through a uniform security lens risks strategic stagnation.

The first theatre is centred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Pashtun belt of Balochistan, where militancy is ideologically driven in the name of religion. Groups such as the TTP and the Haqqani Network, supported by the Afghan Taliban and transnational actors like Daesh and remnants of Al-Qaeda link networks, seek to grab a chunk of land to establish a rigid, exclusionary version of a Sunni theocratic state.

The return of the Afghan Taliban to power has altered the operational environment in their favour. Whether through direct support, tolerance or inability to act, the space available to anti-Pakistan militant groups across the border has expanded. The TTP has demonstrated renewed organisational coherence and operational capability, carrying out increasingly sophisticated attacks with arms left by the US.

The second theatre lies in Balochistan’s Baloch-majority districts, where the conflict is not religious but political. Baloch insurgent groups frame their struggle around grievances of political marginalisation, inequitable resource distribution, lack of provincial autonomy and human rights concerns. Their objectives range from greater autonomy within the federation to outright separatism.

These are fundamentally different conflicts. One is ideological and transnational; the other is political and sub-nationalist. Yet Pakistan’s response to both remains overwhelmingly similar: intelligence-based military operations, supplemented increasingly lately using airpower, including reported cross-border strikes against militant sanctuaries.

There is little doubt that such operations have delivered tactical gains. However, tactical success has not translated into lasting stability. Militant violence subsides temporarily, only to re-emerge in more adaptive forms. The problem is not the use of force per se; it is over-reliance on it.

A critical but often overlooked dimension of this challenge is the weakening of Pakistan’s institutional coordination framework. The mandate for integrating and harmonising national counterterrorism efforts formally rests with the National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta). Effective coordination requires neutrality and the ability to align federal and provincial actors without institutional bias. 

When coordinating bodies are also participants in the operational domain, issues of turf, ownership and institutional primacy inevitably arise, particularly in relation to civilian federal agencies and provincial counterterrorism departments.

The result is a fragmented response architecture. Information may be shared, but policy coherence remains weak. Provincial counterterrorism departments, already operating under capacity constraints, lack a consistent national framework to align with, while civilian oversight appears increasingly marginalised. At the moment, Pakistan risks continuing with reactive measures rather than a unified national strategy.

Compounding this institutional weakness is the ambiguity surrounding the policy framework itself. The revised National Action Plan (NAP), now being pursued under the banner of Azm-e-Istehkam, is presented as the central roadmap for counterterrorism. However, a closer examination reveals that it largely consists of broad, abstract objectives rather than an actionable strategy. It does not clearly specify who is responsible for what, nor does it establish time-bound targets or measurable benchmarks.

Without clearly assigned responsibilities and timelines, even well-intentioned policy goals risk remaining aspirational. In effect, Pakistan has a declared policy direction in the shape of the National Prevention of Violent Extremism Policy of 2024, but lacks an execution framework.

What is needed instead is a truly holistic national policy – one that places economic security at its core, recognising that instability, unemployment and regional disparities create fertile ground for both ideological militancy and political insurgency. This must be complemented by integrated efforts in internal security, social development and foreign policy, particularly in managing relations with Afghanistan. Counterterrorism cannot succeed in isolation from these broader state functions.

In the case of religious militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan is engaged in a war of ideas as much as a war of arms. Groups like the TTP and Islamic State Khorasan draw strength from narratives of religious legitimacy, anti-state rhetoric and exploitation of governance gaps. 

Yet the state’s counter-narrative remains weak and fragmented. It relies mainly on the Pyam e Pakistan fatwa which declares suicide bombing and killing of innocent persons as unIslamic but is silent on telling the youth that the concept of nation-states and developments in social sectors are in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. The recent use of labels of Fitna al Khawarij and Fitna al Hind seems to be a step in the right direction, but the neglected area of madrassa reforms still provides spaces of radicalisation.

In Balochistan, the limitations of a kinetic first approach are even more evident. Political grievances cannot be resolved solely through force. While security operations may suppress insurgent activity, they do little to address the underlying causes that sustain it. Development initiatives, often presented as solutions, struggle to gain legitimacy when local populations feel excluded from decision-making or perceive benefits as externally driven.

The absence of meaningful political dialogue, transparent resource-sharing mechanisms, and empowered local governance structures continues to widen the trust deficit. As history repeatedly shows, sub-nationalist insurgencies rarely end without political accommodation.

Recent indications of a more assertive posture, including cross-border strikes into Afghanistan, reflect growing frustration within Pakistan’s security establishment. However, escalation without a parallel diplomatic and political strategy carries significant risks and regional tensions, civilian fallout, and further radicalisation. More importantly, it does not address the core drivers of militancy, ideology, governance deficits and political exclusion.

A coherent and holistic counterterrorism strategy is urgently needed, one that clearly distinguishes between the nature of threats and aligns responses accordingly. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, this means pairing precise security operations with a robust ideological counteroffensive, improved policing and better governance. In Balochistan, it requires a shift from a security-led to a politically led approach, grounded in dialogue, inclusion, and fairness.

At the national level, restoring Nacta’s authority, moving beyond abstract formulations in the revised National Action Plan and translating Azm e Istehkam into a time-bound, executable framework are no longer optional but urgent necessities. The choice now is stark: continue managing violence through episodic force or confront its causes through a coherent national strategy? Without that shift, the state risks remaining locked in a cycle in which tactical victories are repeatedly overtaken by strategic failure.

The writer is a former inspector general of police (Punjab) and a former Punjab caretaker home minister.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

Originally published in The News