India-China thaw

A brisk diplomatic engagement has gained momentum between India and China over the past few months, following years of tension after their 2020 clashes in Galwan, in the Ladakh-Aksai Chin region.

Both sides are keen to repair contentious ties. Their stated objective is to resolve long-standing border disputes in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Yet, signals from both capitals indicate that the entente also reflects emerging strategic realignments: a rejection of bloc politics in Asia, a joint stance against punitive US tariffs and a renewed emphasis on boosting bilateral trade and investment.

This latest cycle of Sino-Indian diplomacy began with Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s trip to Beijing in July. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi conveyed to him that the China-India “relationship is not directed against any third party, nor should it be disrupted by any third party” – an oblique reference to the US.

During his subsequent visit to New Delhi, Wang Yi emphasised that China and India should regard one another as “partners”, not “adversaries or threats”. The Chinese ambassador in India went further, denouncing the 50% tariffs imposed by Washington on Indian exports and calling the US a “bully”. He pledged that Beijing would support New Delhi at the WTO in upholding the multilateral trading system.

China now looks forward to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin for the SCO Summit and his bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping. According to Indian officials, Wang Yi’s visit sought progress on “de-escalation, delimitation and boundary affairs”. 

Yet New Delhi also raised concerns about China’s plan to build the world’s largest dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet. India fears downstream impacts on the Brahmaputra but conveniently overlooks its own unilateral suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan.

This newfound camaraderie between Beijing and New Delhi has not gone down well in Washington. White House Trade Advisor Peter Navarro, writing in the Financial Times, accused India of “cosying up to both Russia and China” and acting as a “global clearinghouse for Russian oil”, warning that “If India wants to be treated as a strategic partner of the US, it needs to start acting like one”. 

Meanwhile, Russia has revived a proposal to hold a trilateral meeting with China and India to explore a new grouping independent of US influence.

Why the sudden turnaround in India’s foreign policy, especially after it had positioned itself as a US-aligned counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific? Strains began to emerge during the Trump administration, when the US president labelled India the “tariff king”. Trade negotiations faltered as India resisted opening its agricultural, dairy and pharmaceutical sectors. 

Washington was equally frustrated by India’s purchase of discounted Russian crude. India argued that it complied with the Biden administration’s price cap to stabilise markets, but US officials remained unconvinced.

On August 4, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller accused India of financing Russia’s war in Ukraine. Confidence in India’s political will and capability to “stand up” to China also waned. India’s activism in BRICS and the Global South, advocating an alternative international financial system, further alarmed Republicans and Trump's MAGA constituency. 

The decisive catalyst, however, was the May 2025 war between India and Pakistan. Washington worked tirelessly to broker a ceasefire and avert an impending catastrophe in South Asia. Pakistan welcomed US mediation, but India rejected any such role and publicly insulted President Trump’s team. The episode left deep scars.

More galling for New Delhi was Trump's invitation to COAS Field Marshal Asim Munir to the White House soon after the war. The visit aligned the US-Pakistan strategic agenda, paving the way for stronger defence and economic ties. 

Tariffs on Pakistani exports were set at 19%, the lowest in the region. By contrast, India had suffered a humiliating military defeat, which underscored the superiority of Chinese-Pakistani defence platforms and hardware.

The spate of diplomacy now raises pressing questions. Is India genuinely shifting towards China, or is it simply signalling to Washington that it has other options? For Beijing, the rapprochement is a net gain. A chastened India appears willing to heed Wang Yi’s counsel: “the two countries should build mutual trust instead of suspicion, pursue cooperation instead of rivalry, and seek mutual success instead of mutual attrition”.

Nevertheless, the trajectory suggests tactical manoeuvring rather than a tectonic shift in the global order. India and China remain competitors. Only after the conclusion — or collapse — of India-US tariff talks will the durability of India’s tilt toward China become clear.

Despite present frictions, India’s relations with the US are stronger, with deeper institutional linkages built over decades. By contrast, China’s diplomatic toolkit is broader and smarter: its Belt and Road Initiative binds nearly 140 countries across continents. If Washington’s ‘China decoupling’ strategy shrinks, India’s utility as an alternative manufacturing hub may diminish, though its value as an export destination will endure. 

A closer look reveals contrasting national psyches. India views China as an enemy despite conciliatory rhetoric. China, however, does not reciprocate this hostility; instead approaching India pragmatically.

Should Pakistan be worried about the Sino-India thaw? The answer is no, but vigilance remains essential. Even during periods of Sino-Indian friction, New Delhi sought to obstruct Chinese loans to Pakistan under various pretexts. That pattern may persist. India may also attempt to balance its relations with both China and the US, much like Pakistan has managed for decades. For Islamabad, the prudent course is to monitor dynamics carefully without overreacting. 

The thaw is more about India manoeuvring between great powers than genuine reconciliation with China. Beijing’s engagement with New Delhi is unlikely to dilute its strategic partnership with Pakistan.

The recent surge in Sino-Indian diplomacy reflects the fluidity of global alignments following the May 2025 war. For China, reaching out to India enhances regional influence and chips away at Washington’s hold on New Delhi. For India, warming relations with Beijing provide leverage in tariff disputes with the US. For Pakistan, the key is to remain watchful yet confident: its ties with China are much deeper and strategic, while its renewed partnership with Washington has created a favourable balance and a new space.

In essence, the so-called thaw between India and China is a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic shift in the high-stakes game of global diplomacy.

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan to the US, UN and China. He is also the former president of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Originally published in The News